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Archive for the ‘AD Queries’ Category

(2019-11-21) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts (Part 5)

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-21


With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Account And Password Hygiene” related information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Enabled (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Last Set On (e.g. <date/time> or "Must Chng At Next Logon")
  • Has Adm Count Stamp (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Delegatable Adm (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Does Not Req Pre-AuthN (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Sid History (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has LM Hash (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Default Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Blank Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Uses DES Keys Only (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Missing AES Keys (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Rev Encrypt (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Not Req (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Never Expires (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Shared Pwd (e.g. TRUE – Domain Shrd Pwd Grp x Of y or FALSE)
  • Compromised Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Most Used Hash (e.g. <hash> (<count>) or N.A.)

When the script finishes, it produces a CSV report that contains every account in the AD forest that can authenticate (user, computer, gMSA, inetOrgPerson) and potentially be a threat, and it displays that CSV in a GridView automatically. The CSV can of course also be used in Excel if needed. With this information you may be able to remove or fix configurations and/or get an idea how things look like to mitigate risks as much as possible!

While the script is running it logs every to a log file. which is in the same folder as the script itself.

This script requires:

  • PowerShell Module: ActiveDirectory
  • PowerShell Module: LithnetPasswordProtection
  • PowerShell Module: DSInternals
  • LithNet Active Directory Password Protection Store With Banned Words And/Or Compromised Passwords/Hashes
  • Enterprise Admin Permissions, or at least "Replicate Directory Changes" and "Replicate Directory Changes All" for EVERY NC in the AD forest!
    REMARK: Script does check for Enterprise Admin role permissions!

Scan/Check All Accounts In The AD Forest And Create The Report

.\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_05_Account-And-Password-Hygiene-Info.ps1

The script has been tested in three different AD forests:

  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with less than 500 accounts and quite some account config
  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with approx. 150000 accounts and less account config
  • AD forest with Multiple AD domains (Forest Root Domain, Child Domain and Tree Root Domain) with approx. respectively 4000, 25000 and 12000 accounts and less account config

image

Figure 1a: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1b: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1c: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1d: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1e: Sample Output Of The Log File

To open the CSV on another computer and display it in GridView, execute the following command:

Import-CSV <Full Path To The CSV File> | Out-Gridview

image

Figure 2a: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

image

Figure 2b: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

To get the script, see: Scan And Check All Accounts In AD Forest – Account And Password Hygiene

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, IT Pro Tools, Passwords, PowerShell, Replication, Security, Security, Tooling/Scripting | 2 Comments »

(2019-11-18) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts (Part 4)

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-18


With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Permissions At Object Level” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Protected Group Membership (e.g. <comma separated list of group account names> or "No Memberships")
    REMARK: With protected groups, the focus is ONLY on default AD Protected Groups (e.g. BUILTIN\Administrators", "<DOMAIN>\Domain Admins", etc.)
    REMARK: if protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
  • ACE On AdminSDHolder (e.g. <comma separated list of objects with configured permissions> or "No ACEs")
    REMARK: If protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
    REMARK: It will only look at explicit defined ACEs. Inherited ACEs are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
  • Powerful ACEs On Objects (e.g. <comma separated list of objects with configured permissions> or "No ACEs")
    REMARK: If protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
    REMARK: It will only look at explicit defined ACEs. Inherited ACEs are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs

The following ACEs are considered powerful:

  • Full Control
  • Password Reset Control Access Rights
  • Control Access Right In General
  • WriteOwner (Allows to write the owner and that allows to write the DACL)
  • Write DACL
  • Write Property In General
  • Write Property For “lockoutTime” (Unlocking Account)
  • Write Property For “msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo” (Adding/removing accounts for account based delegation)
  • Write Property For “msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity” (Adding/removing accounts for resourced based delegation)
  • Write Property For “servicePrincipalName” (Adding/removing SPNs)
  • Write Property For “userAccountControl” (Managing security/delegation settings, enabling/disabling account)

When the script finishes, it produces a CSV report that contains every account in the AD forest that can authenticate (user, computer, gMSA, inetOrgPerson) and potentially be a threat, and it displays that CSV in a GridView automatically. The CSV can of course also be used in Excel if needed. With this information you may be able to remove or fix configurations and/or get an idea how things look like to mitigate risks as much as possible!

While the script is running it logs every to a log file. which is in the same folder as the script itself.

This script requires:

  • PowerShell Module: ActiveDirectory
  • Basic User Permissions, Nothing Special!

Scan/Check All Accounts In The AD Forest And Create The Report

.\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_04_Object-Level-Permissions-Info.ps1

The script has been tested in three different AD forests:

  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with less than 500 accounts and quite some account config
  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with approx. 150000 accounts and less account config
  • AD forest with Multiple AD domains (Forest Root Domain, Child Domain and Tree Root Domain) with approx. respectively 4000, 25000 and 12000 accounts and less account config

image

Figure 1a: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1b: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1c: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1d: Sample Output Of The Log File

To open the CSV on another computer and display it in GridView, execute the following command:

Import-CSV <Full Path To The CSV File> | Out-Gridview

image

Figure 2: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

To get the script, see: Scan And Check All Accounts In AD Forest – Object Level Permissions Info

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, Delegation Of Control, IT Pro Tools, PowerShell, Security, Security, Tooling/Scripting | Leave a Comment »

(2019-11-15) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts (Part 3)

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-15


With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Permissions At NC Level” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • DS Repl Chng Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")
  • DS Repl Chng All Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")
  • Migr SID History Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")

When the script finishes, it produces a CSV report that contains every account in the AD forest that can authenticate (user, computer, gMSA, inetOrgPerson) and potentially be a threat, and it displays that CSV in a GridView automatically. The CSV can of course also be used in Excel if needed. With this information you may be able to remove or fix configurations and/or get an idea how things look like to mitigate risks as much as possible!

While the script is running it logs every to a log file. which is in the same folder as the script itself.

This script requires:

  • PowerShell Module: ActiveDirectory
  • Basic User Permissions, Nothing Special!

Scan/Check All Accounts In The AD Forest And Create The Report

.\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_03_NC-Level-Permissions-Info.ps1

The script has been tested in three different AD forests:

  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with less than 500 accounts and quite some account config
  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with approx. 150000 accounts and less account config
  • AD forest with Multiple AD domains (Forest Root Domain, Child Domain and Tree Root Domain) with approx. respectively 4000, 25000 and 12000 accounts and less account config

image

Figure 1a: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1b: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1c: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1d: Sample Output Of The Log File

To open the CSV on another computer and display it in GridView, execute the following command:

Import-CSV <Full Path To The CSV File> | Out-Gridview

image

Figure 2: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

To get the script, see: Scan And Check All Accounts In AD Forest – NC Level Permissions Info

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, Delegation Of Control, IT Pro Tools, PowerShell, Security, Security, Tooling/Scripting | Leave a Comment »

(2019-11-12) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts (Part 2)

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-12


With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Kerberos Delegation” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Service Principal Name(s) (e.g. <comma separated list of SPNs> or "No SPNs")
  • Acc Based Deleg Type (e.g. "No-Acc-Deleg" or "Acc-Unc-Deleg" or "Acc-Con-Deleg-AnyAuthN" or "Acc-Con-Deleg-KerbAuthN"
  • Acc Based Deleg To (e.g. <comma separated list of SPNs> or "No Delegated SPNs")
  • Res Based Deleg For (e.g. <comma separated list of user account names with type and domain listed> or "No-Res-Deleg"

When the script finishes, it produces a CSV report that contains every account in the AD forest that can authenticate (user, computer, gMSA, inetOrgPerson) and potentially be a threat, and it displays that CSV in a GridView automatically. The CSV can of course also be used in Excel if needed. With this information you may be able to remove or fix configurations and/or get an idea how things look like to mitigate risks as much as possible!

While the script is running it logs every to a log file. which is in the same folder as the script itself.

This script requires:

  • PowerShell Module: ActiveDirectory
  • Basic User Permissions, Nothing Special!

Scan/Check All Accounts In The AD Forest And Create The Report

.\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_02_Delegation-Info.ps1

The script has been tested in three different AD forests:

  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with less than 500 accounts and quite some account config
  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with approx. 150000 accounts and less account config
  • AD forest with Multiple AD domains (Forest Root Domain, Child Domain and Tree Root Domain) with approx. respectively 4000, 25000 and 12000 accounts and less account config

image

Figure 1a: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1b: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1c: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1d: Sample Output Of The Log File

To open the CSV on another computer and display it in GridView, execute the following command:

Import-CSV <Full Path To The CSV File> | Out-Gridview

image

Figure 2: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

To get the script, see: Scan And Check All Accounts In AD Forest – Delegation Info

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, Delegation, IT Pro Tools, Kerberos AuthN, Kerberos Constrained Delegation, PowerShell, Security, Security, Tooling/Scripting | Leave a Comment »

(2019-11-09) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts (Part 1)

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-09


With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “basic” account information that is related to security.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • User Principal Name  (e.g. ‘jorge@iamtec.nl’)
  • Display Name (e.g. Jorge de Almeida Pinto)
  • Enabled (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Locked (e.g. TRUE – At:<date/time> or FALSE – Never Locked or FALSE – Has Been Locked Before)
  • Account Expires On (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER)
  • Pwd Last Set On (e.g. <date/time> or "Must Chng At Next Logon")
  • Pwd Never Expires (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Last Logon Timestamp (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER)
  • Last Logon (RWDC) (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER Or NOT AVAILABLE (On ‘<FQDN RWDC>’)) <– THIS MEANS IT WILL QUERY EVERY DC (RWDC And RODC) In The AD Domain To Get The LastLogon Property From That DC! (Will be slow!)

When the script finishes, it produces a CSV report that contains every account in the AD forest that can authenticate (user, computer, gMSA, inetOrgPerson) and potentially be a threat, and it displays that CSV in a GridView automatically. The CSV can of course also be used in Excel if needed. With this information you may be able to remove or fix configurations and/or get an idea how things look like to mitigate risks as much as possible!

While the script is running it logs every to a log file. which is in the same folder as the script itself.

This script requires:

  • PowerShell Module: ActiveDirectory
  • Basic User Permissions, Nothing Special!

Scan/Check All Accounts In The AD Forest And Create The Report

.\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_01_Basic-Info.ps1

The script has been tested in three different AD forests:

  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with less than 500 accounts and quite some account config
  • AD forest with a Single AD domain with approx. 150000 accounts and less account config
  • AD forest with Multiple AD domains (Forest Root Domain, Child Domain and Tree Root Domain) with approx. respectively 4000, 25000 and 12000 accounts and less account config

image

Figure 1a: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1b: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1c: Sample Output Of The Log File

image

Figure 1d: Sample Output Of The Log File

To open the CSV on another computer and display it in GridView, execute the following command:

Import-CSV <Full Path To The CSV File> | Out-Gridview

image

Figure 2: Sample Output Of The CSV File Displayed In PowerShell GridView

To get the script, see: Scan And Check All Accounts In AD Forest – Basic Info

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, IT Pro Tools, Last Logon Information, PowerShell, Security, Security, Tooling/Scripting | Leave a Comment »

(2019-11-08) Active Directory Security Scan Of Accounts

Posted by Jorge on 2019-11-08


This month will have a serious security focus in scanning your AD to determine all kinds of account configurations, see relations between those configurations and mitigate any security risks due to combined configurations. A simple example can be an account with unconstrained delegation configured while it has a weak/compromised password, etc, etc.

To scan the accounts within an Active Directory forest, I will be releasing 5 PowerShell scripts.

[Script 1] .\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_01_Basic-Info.ps1

Features:

With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “basic” account information that is related to security.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • User Principal Name  (e.g. ‘jorge@iamtec.nl’)
  • Display Name (e.g. Jorge de Almeida Pinto)
  • Enabled (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Locked (e.g. TRUE – At:<date/time> or FALSE – Never Locked or FALSE – Has Been Locked Before)
  • Account Expires On (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER)
  • Pwd Last Set On (e.g. <date/time> or "Must Chng At Next Logon")
  • Pwd Never Expires (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Last Logon Timestamp (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER)
  • Last Logon (RWDC) (e.g. <date/time> or NEVER Or NOT AVAILABLE (On ‘<FQDN RWDC>’))

[Script 2] .\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_02_Delegation-Info.ps1

Features:

With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Kerberos Delegation” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Service Principal Name(s) (e.g. <comma separated list of SPNs> or "No SPNs")
  • Acc Based Deleg Type (e.g. "No-Acc-Deleg" or "Acc-Unc-Deleg" or "Acc-Con-Deleg-AnyAuthN" or "Acc-Con-Deleg-KerbAuthN"
  • Acc Based Deleg To (e.g. <comma separated list of SPNs> or "No Delegated SPNs")
  • Res Based Deleg For (e.g. <comma separated list of user account names with type and domain listed> or "No-Res-Deleg"

[Script 3] .\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_03_NC-Level-Permissions-Info.ps1

Features:

With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Permissions At NC Level” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • DS Repl Chng Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")
  • DS Repl Chng All Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")
  • Migr SID History Perms (e.g. "<comma separated list of domain DNs> (<Assigned Security Principal>)" or "No Perms")

[Script 4] .\Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_04_Object-Level-Permissions-Info.ps1

Features:

With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Permissions At Object Level” related account information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Protected Group Membership (e.g. <comma separated list of group account names> or "No Memberships")
    REMARK: With protected groups, the focus is ONLY on default AD Protected Groups (e.g. BUILTIN\Administrators", "<DOMAIN>\Domain Admins", etc.)
    REMARK: if protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
  • ACE On AdminSDHolder (e.g. <comma separated list of objects with configured permissions> or "No ACEs")
    REMARK: If protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
    REMARK: It will only look at explicit defined ACEs. Inherited ACEs are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
  • Powerful ACEs On Objects (e.g. <comma separated list of objects with configured permissions> or "No ACEs")
    REMARK: If protected groups are listed then any ACEs for those protected groups are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs
    REMARK: It will only look at explicit defined ACEs. Inherited ACEs are NOT listed to prevent an overload of ACEs

[Script 5] \Scan-And-Check-All-Accounts-In-AD-Forest_05_Account-And-Password-Hygiene-Info.ps1

Features:

With the PoSH script made available through this blog post you can scan and check ALL accounts in the AD forest to get “Account And Password Hygiene” related information.

Through LDAP queries, this PoSH script retrieves the following information for every account in the AD forest that is able to authenticate:

  • Domain FQDN (e.g. ‘IAMTEC.NET’)
  • Domain NBT (e.g. ‘IAMTEC’)
  • Domain DN (e.g. ‘DC=IAMTEC,DC=NET’)
  • Sam Account Name (e.g. ‘jorge’)
  • Account Name (e.g. ‘IAMTEC\jorge’)
  • Account Type (computer, inetOrgPerson, msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount, trust (user), user)
  • Enabled (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Last Set On (e.g. <date/time> or "Must Chng At Next Logon")
  • Has Adm Count Stamp (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Delegatable Adm (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Does Not Req Pre-AuthN (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Sid History (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has LM Hash (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Default Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Blank Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Uses DES Keys Only (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Missing AES Keys (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Rev Encrypt (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Not Req (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Pwd Never Expires (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Has Shared Pwd (e.g. TRUE – Domain Shrd Pwd Grp x Of y or FALSE)
  • Compromised Pwd (e.g. TRUE or FALSE)
  • Most Used Hash (e.g. <hash> (<count>) or N.A.)

Interested in this? Stay tuned!

Thanks!

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Blog Post Series, Delegation, Delegation Of Control, IT Pro Tools, Kerberos Constrained Delegation, Last Logon Information, Passwords, PowerShell, Replication, Security, Tooling/Scripting | 2 Comments »

(2019-10-08) Synched Computers/Devices Being Cleaned Up From Azure AD

Posted by Jorge on 2019-10-08


Starting with version 1.4.18.0 and higher of Azure AD Connect, you may see some or all of their Windows devices disappear from Azure AD after upgrade to that version and executing a sync cycle. This is not a cause for concern, as these device identities are not used by Azure AD during conditional access authorization. This change won’t delete any Windows devices that were correctly registered with Azure AD for Hybrid Azure AD Join.

If you see the deletion of device objects in Azure AD exceeding the Export Deletion Threshold, it is advised that the customer allow the deletions to go through. How To: allow deletes to flow when they exceed the deletion threshold

Nevertheless you may want to analyze the deletion first. You can read the following blog post to see how you could do that: (2019-10-06) Examining Pending Export Deletions In Azure AD Connect

More information about this can be found through Understanding Azure AD Connect 1.4.xx.x and device disappearance

To verify which devices in your AD are candidates to be deleted in Azure AD, you can use the following PowerShell script: Export Hybrid Azure AD join computer certificates report

This script generates a report about certificates stored in Active Directory Computer objects, specifically, certificates issued by the Hybrid Azure AD join feature. It checks the certificates present in the UserCertificate property of a Computer object in AD and, for each non-expired certificate present, validates if the certificate was issued for the Hybrid Azure AD join feature (i.e. Subject Name matches CN={ObjectGUID}). Before, Azure AD Connect would synchronize to Azure AD any Computer that contained at least one valid certificate but starting on Azure AD Connect version 1.4, the synchronization engine can identify Hybrid Azure AD join certificates and will ‘cloudfilter’ the computer object from synchronizing to Azure AD unless there’s a valid Hybrid Azure AD join certificate. Azure AD Devices that were already synchronized to AD but do not have a valid Hybrid Azure AD join certificate will be deleted by the sync engine as these will be filtered from being synched to Azure AD (CloudFiltered=TRUE).

Now this script works great! But….unfortunately it does not work correctly with an AD forest where you may have multiple AD domains. Besides that, there is a cosmetic issue. So, let’s start with the easy part!

The script allows you to specify the distinguished name of a single object or the distinguished name of an OU. However, if you want to query the complete AD domain instead of just a single OU, you may think that’s not possible. Nope, that’s still possible. The original writer of the script chose to name the variable “DN” for just a single object (computer) and “OU” when query for computers in an OU. This last one may mislead due to its chosen name. Nevertheless, instead of the DN of an OU, you can also specify the DN of a container or the DN of a domain.

In a single AD domain environment, this will work flawlessly. However, in a multiple AD domain environment it may not. Due to historic reasons many companies may still have AD forests with multiple AD domains for which it is not cost effective to consolidate. For example, if you have the AD forest COMPANY.COM, with the following AD domains: COMPANY.COM, CHILD1.COMPANY.COM and CHILD2.COMPANY.COM. If you are COMPANY.COM and you need to query for objects in CHILD1.COMPANY.COM through PowerShell while not specifying the server variable (as in this script), it will throw an error due to a so called redirection. To query for an object from another AD domain you need to also target a DC from that same AD domain. If you need to query multiple AD domains you will be dancing all over the place! Sometimes, there is no other way, but in this case there is! And what if you want to query the complete AD forest while having multiple AD domains? You can always query every individual AD domain, but wouldn’t it be nice to just perform a single AD query that targets the complete AD forest? That is also possible!

When querying AD, especially when having an AD forest with multiple AD domains you always need to think about: (1) is all the data in my LDAP filter in the global catalog or not?, and (2) is the data that I’m looking for in the global catalog?

Then you need to ask yourself: “where to start searching?”. The closer to the objects you want, the better!

Rest assured! All domains objects are in the global catalog! The question is: “which attribute values of those objects are also replicated to the global catalog?”

Any attribute that has the property “isMemberOfPartialAttributeSet” set to “TRUE” also replicates its value(s) to all global catalogs in the AD forest. To find all the attributes in the AD schema for which its value(s) replicate to the global catalog, you can have a look at the following blog post (2015-01-05) Finding Attributes Marked As Members Of Partial Attribute Set (PAS). It has examples with ADFIND, PowerShell and ADSI.

Now looking at this script, the attribute of interest is “userCertificate”.

To see if an attribute value replicates to the global catalog, you can use:

Get-ADObject -SearchBase $((Get-ADRootDSE).schemaNamingContext) -LDAPFilter "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(lDAPDisplayName=<LDAP DisplayName>))" –Property lDAPDisplayName,isMemberOfPartialAttributeSet

To see if the “userCertificate” attribute value replicates to the global catalog, you can use:

Get-ADObject -SearchBase $((Get-ADRootDSE).schemaNamingContext) -LDAPFilter "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(lDAPDisplayName=userCertificate))" –Property lDAPDisplayName,isMemberOfPartialAttributeSet

image

Figure 1: Partial Schema Info Of The “userCertificate” Attribute

Or you could visit https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-ada3/f9e923d6-c512-4beb-b963-afd695cea8ac, which will show you

image

Figure 2: AD Schema Definition Of The “userCertificate” Attribute

Guess what?! It does replicate to the global catalog! So, in this case the answer to both questions above is “YES”, therefore we can use the global catalog to perform this query

When you need to query the AD forest, you could start searching in the forest root AD domain and hopefully the client you are using supports Referral Chasing. If it does not, it may throw an error telling you it does not support it, or it just does not do anything. Wouldn’t it be nice to have something represent the AD forest? well, there is something like that, which is called a Phantom Root and it is specified by just 2 quotes and you can only use it when querying against the Global Catalog!

Now for all this to work, some adjustments are needed in the original script! I’ll guide you through that to get a new working script.

First things first. Download the PowerShell script: Export Hybrid Azure AD join computer certificates report 

Replace…

.EXAMPLE
   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -DN ‘CN=Computer1,OU=SYNC,DC=Fabrikam,DC=com’
.EXAMPLE
   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -OU ‘OU=SYNC,DC=Fabrikam,DC=com’ -Filename "MyHybridAzureADjoinReport.csv" -Verbose

…with

.EXAMPLE
    Looking at a specific computer

   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -DN ‘CN=Computer1,OU=SYNC,DC=Fabrikam,DC=com’
.EXAMPLE
    Looking at computer objects within a specific OU
   
   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -DN ‘OU=SYNC,DC=Fabrikam,DC=com’ -Filename "MyHybridAzureADjoinReport.csv" -Verbose
.EXAMPLE
    Looking at computer objects within a specific AD domain
   
   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -DN ‘DC=child,DC=Fabrikam,DC=com’ -Filename "MyHybridAzureADjoinReport.csv" -Verbose
.EXAMPLE
    Looking at computer objects within a specific AD forest
   
   .\Export-ADSyncToolsHybridAzureADjoinCertificateReport.ps1 -DN PhantomRoot -Filename "MyHybridAzureADjoinReport.csv" -Verbose

Replace…

Param
(
    # Computer DistinguishedName
    [Parameter(ParameterSetName=’SingleObject’,
               Mandatory=$true,
                ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$true,
               Position=0)]
    [String]
    $DN,

    # AD OrganizationalUnit
    [Parameter(ParameterSetName=’MultipleObjects’,
               Mandatory=$true,
               ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$true,
               Position=0)]
    [String]
    $OU,

    # Output CSV filename (optional)
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$false,
                ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$false,
               Position=1)]
    [String]
    $Filename

)

…with

Param
(
    # DistinguishedName of computer, OU, or domain
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$true,
               ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$true,
               Position=0)]
    [String]
    $DN,

    # Output CSV filename (optional)
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$false,
                ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$false,
               Position=1)]
    [String]
    $Filename
)

Replace…

# Read AD object(s)
If ($PSCmdlet.ParameterSetName -eq ‘SingleObject’)
{
    $directoryObjs = @(Get-ADObject $DN -Properties UserCertificate)
     Write-Verbose "Starting report for a single object ‘$DN’"
}
Else
{
    $directoryObjs = Get-ADObject -Filter { ObjectClass -like ‘computer’ } -SearchBase $OU -Properties UserCertificate
    Write-Verbose "Starting report for $($directoryObjs.Count) computer objects in OU ‘$OU’"
}

…with

# Retrieve Object Type Of DN
If ($DN -ne "PhantomRoot")
{
    $objectType = (Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter "(distinguishedname=$DN)").objectClass # Do not use Get-ADObject $DN as it will throw an error if the object does not exist (even with ErrorAction defined)!
}
Else
{
    $objectType = "forestDNS" # Madeup, not for real!
    $DN = ""
}

   
# Read AD object(s)
If ($objectType -eq "computer")
{
    $domainFQDN = $($DN.SubString($DN.IndexOf(",DC=") + 1)).Replace(",DC=",".").Replace("DC=","")
    $directoryObjs = @(Get-ADObject $DN -Properties userCertificate -Server $domainFQDN)
}
ElseIf ($objectType -eq "domainDNS" -Or $objectType -eq "organizationalUnit" -Or $objectType -eq "container" -Or $objectType -eq "forestDNS")
{
    $gcFQDN = $(Get-ADDomainController -Discover -Service GlobalCatalog).HostName[0]
    $directoryObjs = Get-ADObject -Filter { ObjectClass -like ‘computer’ } -SearchBase $DN -Properties userCertificate -Server $gcFQDN`:3268
}
Else{
    Write-Host "Specified DN ‘$DN’" -Foregroundcolor Red
    Write-Host "Incorrect object type of specified DN or DN does not exist!" -Foregroundcolor Red
    Write-Host "Aborting Script…" -Foregroundcolor Red
   
    EXIT
}

UPDATE 2019-10-12: or get the updated version of the script from here

Hopefully this works for you in your AD environment!

Cheers,

Jorge

————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
Always evaluate/test everything yourself first before using/implementing this in production!
This is today’s opinion/technology, it might be different tomorrow and will definitely be different in 10 years!
DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
########################### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge ##########################
####################
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ###################
————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Posted in Active Directory Users And Computers, AD Queries, Azure AD Connect, Azure AD Join, Conditional Access, Windows Azure Active Directory, Windows Client, Windows Server | Leave a Comment »

(2016-12-20) The LDAP Filter Prettyfier

Posted by Jorge on 2016-12-20


Have you ever received an LDAP filter that was so hideous or so complex you had to reformat it to understand it? Well, you no longer need reformat it yourself!

Willem Kasdorp, a Microsoft PFE, has written a very effective PowerShell script that reformat any LDAP filter to a more understandable form. You can read more about this, and also get the PowerShell code from here.

I once received an LDAP filter similar to what you see below:

"(|(&(|(mail=*@company.nl)(mail=*@company.com))(!mail=*testuser*)(!mail=*internal*)(!mail=*1111*)(!mail=*zz-pa1111*)(!mail=*2222*)(!mail=*somestring1*)(!mail=*somestring2*)(!mail=vendor*)(!mail=*somestring3*)(!mail=*somestring4*)(!displayName=aaa*)(!name=bbb*)(!name=ccc*)(!name=ddd*)(!sAMAccountName=eee*)(!sAMAccountName=admin*)(!sAMAccountName=fff*)(!title=functional*)(!displayName=ggg*)(!displayName=hhh*)(!displayName=iii*)(!msExchHideFromAddressLists=TRUE))(&(|(mail=*@company.nl)(mail=*@company.com))(!mail=*somestring5*)(!mail=*somestring6*)(!mail=*3333*)(!mail=*zz-pa2222*)(!mail=*4444*)(!mail=*somestring7*)(!mail=*somestring1*)(!mail=vendor*)(!mail=*somestring8*)(!mail=*somestring9*)(!name=jjj)(!name=kkk*)(!name=lll*)(!sAMAccountName=mmm*)(!sAMAccountName=admin*)(!sAMAccountName=nnn*)(!title=functional*)(!displayName=ooo*)(!displayName=ppp*)(!displayName=qqq*)(msExchHideFromAddressLists=TRUE)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))"

There is NO WAY you will understand this LDAP filter without reformatting it first to some more understandable form!

So, let’s use the PowerShell script and see what the LDAP filter is actually doing

image

Figure 1: Prettyfying The LDAP Filter To An Understandable Format

(|
  (&
    (|
      (mail=*@company.nl)
      (mail=*@company.com)
    )
    (!mail=*testuser*)
    (!mail=*internal*)
    (!mail=*1111*)
    (!mail=*zz-pa1111*)
    (!mail=*2222*)
    (!mail=*somestring1*)
    (!mail=*somestring2*)
    (!mail=vendor*)
    (!mail=*somestring3*)
    (!mail=*somestring4*)
    (!displayName=aaa*)
    (!name=bbb*)
    (!name=ccc*)
    (!name=ddd*)
    (!sAMAccountName=eee*)
    (!sAMAccountName=admin*)
    (!sAMAccountName=fff*)
    (!title=functional*)
    (!displayName=ggg*)
    (!displayName=hhh*)
    (!displayName=iii*)
    (!msExchHideFromAddressLists=TRUE)
  )
  (&
    (|
      (mail=*@company.nl)
      (mail=*@company.com)
    )
    (!mail=*somestring5*)
    (!mail=*somestring6*)
    (!mail=*3333*)
    (!mail=*zz-pa2222*)
    (!mail=*4444*)
    (!mail=*somestring7*)
    (!mail=*somestring1*)
    (!mail=vendor*)
    (!mail=*somestring8*)
    (!mail=*somestring9*)
    (!name=jjj)
    (!name=kkk*)
    (!name=lll*)
    (!sAMAccountName=mmm*)
    (!sAMAccountName=admin*)
    (!sAMAccountName=nnn*)
    (!title=functional*)
    (!displayName=ooo*)
    (!displayName=ppp*)
    (!displayName=qqq*)
    (msExchHideFromAddressLists=TRUE)
    (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)
  )
)

Cheers,
Jorge
———————————————————————————————
* This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
* Always evaluate/test yourself before using/implementing this!
* DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
———————————————————————————————
############### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge #############
#########
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ########
———————————————————————————————

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries | 2 Comments »

(2015-02-20) Finding Attributes Configured To Be Never Audited

Posted by Jorge on 2015-02-20


When an attribute is defined with the bit 2^8 (=256) in the searchFlags property, the attribute is configured to be never audited. When “Directory Services Access” is enabled AND the correct SACL has been configured on objects for a specific action on the attribute by specific actors, access (read or write) those attributes will be audited by default. When “Directory Services Changes” is enabled AND the correct SACL has been configured on objects for a specific action on the attribute by specific actors, the values (before and after the change) of those attributes will also be audited by default. To disable the behavior of also auditing values for one or more attributes, those attributes can be configured not to be change audited at all. This might be of interest for those attributes that have been configured as confidential and auditing has been enabled on the object.

ADFIND

ADFIND -h R1FSRWDC1.IAMTEC.NET -schema -f "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(searchFlags:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=256))" -dn

OR

ADFIND -h R1FSRWDC1.IAMTEC.NET -bit -schema -f "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(searchFlags:AND:=256))" -dn

image

Figure 1: Example Output

AD PoSH Module

Get-ADObject -Server R1FSRWDC1.IAMTEC.NET -SearchBase $((Get-ADRootDSE).schemaNamingContext) -LDAPFilter "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(searchFlags:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=256))" | %{$_.DistinguishedName}

ADSI Through PoSH

$targetDC = "R1FSRWDC1.IAMTEC.NET"
$rootDSE = [ADSI]"LDAP://$targetDC/RootDSE"
$schemaNamingContext = $rootDSE.schemaNamingContext
$search = New-Object DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher([ADSI]"")
$Search.SearchRoot = "LDAP://$targetDC/$schemaNamingContext"
$search.filter = "(&(objectClass=attributeSchema)(searchFlags:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=256))"
$search.FindAll() | %{$_.Properties.distinguishedname}

PS: replace the FQDN of the DC with your info

PS: the opposite of this query can be found by replacing (searchFlags:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=256) with (!(searchFlags:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=256))

More information:

Cheers,
Jorge
———————————————————————————————
* This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties and confers no rights!
* Always evaluate/test yourself before using/implementing this!
* DISCLAIMER:
https://jorgequestforknowledge.wordpress.com/disclaimer/
———————————————————————————————
############### Jorge’s Quest For Knowledge #############
#########
http://JorgeQuestForKnowledge.wordpress.com/ ########
———————————————————————————————

Posted in Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS), AD Queries, Schema, Tooling/Scripting | Leave a Comment »

 
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